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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE CITY,
a municipal corporation,
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs,
Case No. 950166-CA
WILLIS DORMAN-LIGH,
Defendant/Appellee,

JURISDICTION
Section 78-2a-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Was there a legally sufficient factual basis for the

lower Court's finding (a) that the Court had issued an order,
rather than an informal, non-binding request, to the Salt Lake
City Prosecutor, Ms. Cheryl Luke, to be in attendance at and be
prepared to represent the City at the May 19, 1995 hearing, and
(b) that Ms. Luke had violated such order?
Applicable standard of appellate review: clearly erroneous.
State v. Vincent. 883 P.2d 278 (Utah 1994); State v. Pena. 869
P.2d 932 (Utah 1994); Salt Lake City v. Hanson, 425, P.2d 773
(Utah 1967).

This issue was preserved in the Court's findings of fact
numbered 4, 6 and 10 at Record, pp.97-99.

The Court's findings

were not apparent until they were signed by the Court on January
9, 1995, nearly eight months after the hearing on the Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss and four months after the hearing on the City's
Motion for Rehearing.

Despite the Court's ruling against the

City, the Commissioner ordered counsel for the City to prepare
the findings, conclusions and judgment.

The findings as drafted

by the City's counsel were not objected to by Defendant's
counsel.

2.

Was the Court's sanctioning of the Salt Lake City

Prosecutor without notice and opportunity for hearing violative
of due process?
Applicable standard of appellate review: correction of error
(narrow discretion). State v. Vincent, 883 P.2d 278 (Utah 1994);
State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994).
This issue was preserved in the Court's conclusion of law at
Record, p.100.

3.

Was dismissal of the City's Information eight months

after the motion hearing was held inappropriate and beyond the
power of the Circuit Court Commissioner?
2

Applicable standard of appellate review: correction of error
(narrow discretion). State v. Vincent, 883 P.2d 278 (Utah 1994);
State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994).
This issue was preserved in the Court's conclusion of law at
Record, p.100.

4.

If the Court's request that Ms. Luke appear as the

City's legal counsel at the May 19, 1994 motion hearing, was a
formal order rather than an informal request, did that order and
the subsequent case dismissal for its violation constitute a
violation of separation of powers under the Utah Constitution in
abuse of the Circuit Court Commissioner's discretion?
Applicable standard of appellate review: correction of error
(narrow discretion). State v. Vincent, 883 P.2d 278 (Utah 1994);
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994).
This issue was preserved in the Court's conclusion of law at
Record, p.100.

5.

Was the Circuit Court's sanction inappropriate as

prejudicing the public's interest in health, safety and welfare
and as a ban on enforcement?

Applicable standard of appellate review: correction of error
3

(narrow discretion). State v. Vincent, 883 P.2d 278 (Utah 1994);
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994).
This issue was preserved in the Court's conclusion of law at
Record, p.100.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal by Salt Lake City Corporation (the "City")
of a dismissal by the Third Circuit Court of Utah, Salt Lake
Department, of a criminal Information filed by the City.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
On May 19, 1994, a hearing was held before Commissioner
Palacios of the Third Circuit Court on a motion to dismiss the
Information filed against the Defendant.

At the conclusion of

that hearing, the Court issued a verbal decision dismissing the
Information.

Prior to the execution of any written findings or

judgment the City filed Objections to Defendant's Proposed
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order and Judgment of
Dismissal as well as Plaintiff's Motion for Rehearing and
Supporting Points and Authorities.
4

On September 1, 1994 a

hearing was held before Commissioner Palacios on the City's
Motion for Rehearing.

DISPOSITION BELOW
The Commissioner ruled, both orally and in her written
findings, that the arguments set forth in the City's Motion for
Rehearing were well taken and that the Court's verbal judgment of
May 19, 1994 should be reversed.

However, the Commissioner then

ordered and adjudged that the City's Information should be
dismissed, with prejudice, as a sanction against the Salt Lake
City Prosecutor for violating what the Court considered to be an
order of April 18, 1994 for her to be in attendance and prepared
at the May 19, 1994 hearing.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On February 9, 1993, Salt Lake City filed a criminal

Information against Defendant Dorman-Ligh in the Third Circuit
Court charging her with violations of Salt Lake City's Housing
Code and other ordinances.
2.

(Record, pp.1,2).

At a pre-trial conference held April 18, 1994, the

Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging violations of her
federal and state constitutional rights.
5

(Record, pp.17-25,

113). The Court Commissioner scheduled the date of May 19, 1995
for the hearing on the motion, and she scheduled certain
deadlines prior to that hearing for the filing of the City's
responsive memorandum and for the Defendant's reply memorandum
(Record, p.119).

The Commissioner instructed the City's counsel,

Mr. Todd Godfrey, an Assistant Salt Lake City Prosecutor, to
request Ms. Cheryl Luke, the Salt Lake City Prosecutor, to appear
at the motion hearing. (Record, pp.116,117).
3.

No responsive memorandum was filed by the City and

therefore no reply memorandum was filed by the Defendant.
4.

At the motion hearing, Mr. Jeffrey Gray appeared as

counsel for the City (Record, pp.207-211).

He explained to the

Court that Ms. Luke was unable to be present since she was in a
meeting for the entire day.

(Record, p.209).

that he was not familiar with the matter.

Mr. Gray stated

The Commissioner

stated that she considered Ms. Luke's failure to appear at the
hearing and to argue the motion to be a violation of an order of
the Court. (Record, pp.207-208).

The Commissioner stated that

the Court would like to speak to Ms. Luke later, at a convenient
time, in that regard.

5.

(Record, p.208).

The Commissioner determined that despite the City's not
6

being prepared, the hearing would go forward at that time.
(Record, pp.208-209).

Since Mr. Todd Godfrey was more familiar

with the matter, it was decided that he would take Mr. Gray's
place (Record, pp.209-211).

The Commissioner then proceeded with

the motion hearing with Mr. Godfrey representing Salt Lake City
Corporation (Record, pp.211-233).
6.

After receiving various documents in evidence on behalf

of the Defendant, proffers of testimony, and arguments of
respective counsel, the Commissioner issued a verbal decision, in
open court on May 19, 1994.

That verbal ruling dismissed all

counts of the City's Information on the basis that the City's
building code enforcement mechanism was unconstitutionally
selective.

(Record, pp.230-233).

The Commissioner did not state

in her verbal order that the dismissal was with prejudice
(Record, pp.230-233).
7.

No hearing or other proceeding was held with regard to

the Commissioner's claim that Ms. Cheryl Luke had violated the
Court's order.
8.

Prior to the execution of any written findings or

judgment, the City filed its Objections to Defendant's Proposed
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order and Judgment of
Dismissal (Record, pp.31-46) as well as Plaintiff's Motion for
7

Rehearing and Supporting Points and Authorities with attached
affidavits.

(Record, pp.50-72). On September 1, 1994 a hearing

was held before the Commissioner on the City's Motion for
Rehearing.
9.

(Record, pp.158-194).

On January 9, 1995, the Commissioner issued her findings

that the arguments set forth in the City's Motion for Rehearing
were well taken and that the Court's verbal judgment of May 19,
1995 should be reversed.

(Findings numbered 8 and 9 at Record,

p.99). However, the Commissioner went on to find that the
Information should be dismissed, with prejudice, as a sanction
against the Salt Lake City Prosecutor for violating the Court's
order to be in attendance at and prepared to represent the City
at the May 19, 1994 hearing.
p.99).

(Finding numbered 10 at Record,

The Court ordered and adjudged (in her written judgment

dated February 15, 1995) that the Information be dismissed, with
prejudice.

(Record, p.106).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I.

The finding of the lower Court that it had

previously ordered Cheryl Luke, the Salt Lake City Prosecutor,
personally to appear and to be prepared to argue the Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss, and that Ms. Luke had violated that order, is
8

not supported by facts as set forth in the record.

The facts do

not show that at the April 18, 1994 pretrial conference the Court
issued a sanctionable order to Ms. Luke, nor do they show that
Ms. Luke received such an order and intentionally violated it.

POINT II.

If the Court's request that Ms. Luke be present

at the motion hearing was a sanctionable order, the subsequent
dismissal of the City's Information was violative of due process.
The sanction was for indirect contempt of court allegedly
committed by the Salt Lake City Prosecutor.

However, the

sanctioned Salt Lake City Prosecutor was never given any notice
prior to the administering of the sanction and was never given
the opportunity for a hearing.

POINT III.

If the Court's request that Ms. Luke be present

at the motion hearing was a sanctionable order, the dismissal of
the City's Information, with prejudice, eight months after the
hearing was inappropriate and beyond the authority of the Court.
The Court had already imposed sanctions upon the City by forcing
the City to go forward with the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss
despite the City's having filed no responsive memorandum to the
Defendant's written motion and despite the prosecution's being
9

unprepared for the hearing.

The Defendant was in no way

prejudiced by the City's lack of preparation; in fact, the
Defendant was advantaged by it. The Court could have imposed
additional sanctions on Ms. Luke apart from this case pursuant to
the Court's inherent contempt powers.

However, it was totally

inappropriate for the Court to allow the hearing to go forward,
issue a verbal ruling of dismissal based upon the evidence and
arguments presented, and then later reverse that ruling and
instead dismiss the case, with prejudice, as a sanction for Ms.
Luke's failure to appear at the hearing eight months earlier.

POINT IV.

If the Court's request that Ms. Luke be present

at the motion hearing was a sanctionable order, that order and
the subsequent dismissal of the Information, with prejudice,
constituted a violation of the principle of separation of powers
under Article V, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution, since the
Court was usurping to power of the City, as the executive branch
of government, to exercise its discretion as to the manner in
which it chooses to prosecute its cases and which personnel it
elects to employ to represent the City in a particular case at a
particular time.

10

POINT V.

If the Court's request that Ms. Luke be present at

the motion hearing was a sanctionable order, the subsequent
dismissal of the City's Information as a sanction prejudiced the
public health, safety and welfare.

The appropriate remedy was to

punish the individual attorney rather than to punish the public.
Further, the dismissal, with prejudice, effectively estopped the
City from further enforcement of the housing code violations
which had been charged.

Such a ban contravenes the rule that

government cannot be estopped except in unusual circumstances.

ARGUMENT

POINT I.
THERE WAS NOT A SUFFICIENT FACTUAL
BASIS FOR THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING
THAT THE CITY PROSECUTOR VIOLATED
AN ORDER OF THE COURT

A.

No clear order was issued by the Court.
At the April 18, 1994 pre-trial conference, the Commissioner

requested Assistant City Prosecutor Todd Godfrey to ask Cheryl
Luke, the Salt Lake City Prosecutor, to appear at the hearing on
the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
Godfrey:
11

The Court stated to Mr.

...perhaps what we ought to do in the future is if you
would ask Ms. Luke to appear and make the Court aware
of that. I likewise would have asked her to appear.
In fact, let's do that, have Ms. Luke--I'll schedule a
time and ask her if she will appear at that time both
to argue this and to hear the matter, and I'll just
give it a special setting.
(Emphasis added).

(Record, p.116)

There is nothing in the Court's comments at the April 18,
1994 pre-trial conference which clearly and unequivocally
indicated that Ms. Luke was ordered to appear at the May 19, 1994
motion hearing, and that she would be subject to sanctions for
failing to appear.

It is entirely reasonable that Ms. Luke,

especially getting the message second-hand and not from the
Commissioner personally, might have interpreted the request as
just that, a non-binding request, with the discretion left to Ms.
Luke to assign one of her assistant prosecutors to handle the
motion hearing as she may deem necessary.

B.

The finding of violation of an order of the Court is not
supported by the facts.
In her Findings of Fact, the Commissioner found, inter alia.

the following:
10. However, this Court also finds that
Plaintiff's Information should be dismissed, with
prejudice, as a sanction against the Salt Lake City
Prosecutor, for violating the Court's order to be in
attendance at and be prepared to represent the
12

Plaintiff at the May 19, 1994 hearing in this matter.
(Record, p.99)
Nothing was ever entered on the Court docket sheet nor was
there ever any written order issued by the Court that Ms. Luke
appear at the motion hearing.

There is nothing in the record and

no finding by the Court that Ms. Cheryl Luke received any message
that the Commissioner wanted her to appear at the motion hearing
or that, if she did receive such a message, it was made clear to
her that the request was anything more than an informal, nonbinding suggestion.
The ultimate test of the adequacy of a trial judge's
findings is whether they are sufficiently comprehensive
and pertinent to the issues to provide a basis for
decision. 9 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure 2579 (1971).
The Utah Supreme Court has said regarding review of findings
of fact:
Findings of fact are reviewed by an appellate court
under the clearly erroneous standard. For a reviewing
court to find clear error, it must decide that the
factual findings made by the trial court are not
adequately supported by the record, resolving all
disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to
the trial court's determination. State v. Pena, 869
P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994).
The finding of a violation of a Court order in the instant
case, in the absence of a sufficient factual basis therefor,

13

constituted clear error on the lower Court's part and should be
reversed.

C.

Marshalling of the Evidence.
All of the evidence in support of the Court's Finding

numbered 10 (Record, p.99) that the Court issued a sanctionable
order at the April 18, 1994 pre-trial conference that Ms. Cheryl
Luke be in attendance and prepared at the May 19, 1994 motion
hearing and that Ms. Luke violated that order is found in the
statements of the Court Commissioner at the April 18, 1994 pretrial. Record, pp.113-121.
Observations or opinions of the Court at a later date are
not relevant, since only an objective look at the statements
actually made by the Court at the April 18, 1994 pre-trial and a
determination as to whether a reasonable person would view those
statements as constituting a sanctionable order are appropriate.
The specific pertinent portions of the April 18, 1994
transcript in support of the finding are found at Record pp.116117, 121.

14

POINT II.
THE COURT'S SANCTIONING OF THE
SALT LAKE CITY PROSECUTOR WITHOUT
NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY FOR HEARING
WAg VIOLATIVE OF DUE PROCESS
As stated above, the Commissioner dismissed the City's
criminal Information against Defendant as a sanction against
Cheryl Luke, the Salt Lake City Prosecutor.
#10; Record, pp.99,106).

(Finding of Fact

Although no formal criminal contempt

proceedings were brought against Ms. Luke, the sanction was
issued because of the alleged indirect contempt of Ms. Luke in
failing to be in attendance at and prepared to represent the City
at the May 19, 1994 motion hearing.

(Finding of Fact #10;

Record, p.99).
The courts have distinguished direct contempt from indirect
contempt, as follows:
Summary or direct contempt is committed "in the
immediate view and presence of the court, or judge at
chambers. . . ." Utah Code Annotated 78-32-3 (1987);
see e.g. West Valley City v. Borrego, 752 P.2d 361
(Utah Ct.App. 1988). Summary action is necessitated by
the need to keep order in the court. Cooke v. United
States, 267 U.S. 517, 534, 45 S.Ct. 390, 394, 69 L.Ed.
767 (1925).
Indirect contempt arises when some or all of the
actor's conduct is outside of the court's view and
presence. Ici. at 536.
State v. Halverson, 754 P.2d
1228, 1229 (Utah Ct.App. 1988).

15

The Court went on to emphasize the increased due process
requirements in the instance of indirect contempt:
Because the court does not have immediate knowledge of
all relevant and necessary facts in cases of indirect
contempt, the charge is adjudicated after notice to the
defendant and opportunity for a hearing. Sections 7832-4 and 78-32-9. In Burgers v. Maiben. 652 P.2d 1320
(Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court articulated the due
process requirements in indirect contempt cases, as
follows:
"Thus, in a prosecution for contempt, not
committed in the presence of the court, due
process requires that the person charged be
advised of the nature of the action against him,
have assistance of counsel, if requested, have the
right to confront witnesses, and have the right to
offer testimony on his behalf. Id. at 1322."
State v. Halverson. 754 P.2d 1228, 1229 (Utah
Ct.App. 1988) .
See also, In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); Cooke v. United
States, 267 U.S. 517, 45 S.Ct. 390, 69 L.Ed. 767 (1925); Powers
v. Taylor, 378 P.2d 519 (Utah 1963); Robinson v. City Court of
Ogden. 185 P.2d 256 (Utah 1947).
In the instant case, there is no showing that Ms. Luke ever
received notice of any possibility of any sanction against her,
and no hearing was ever held in that regard.

Fundamental

fairness and the spirit of due process dictate that she should
have been given an opportunity to receive notice and to respond
to the allegation of indirect contempt against her before any

16

sanction was imposed -- including the sanction imposed here of
dismissal of the City's case, with prejudice.

POINT III.
THE DISMISSAL OF THE CITY'S
INFORMATION EIGHT MONTHS AFTER
THE MOTION HEARING WAS INAPPROPRIATE
AND BEYOND THE AUTHORITY OF THE
CIRCUIT COURT COMMISSIONER
On May 19, 1994, when the commissioner, in open court,
called the case for the hearing on the Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss, she expressed her displeasure that Assistant City
Prosecutor, Jeffrey Gray, had appeared in behalf of the City
rather than Ms. Cheryl Luke, the Salt Lake City Prosecutor
(Record, pp.207-211).
She stated that she had ordered Ms. Luke to appear because
Ms. Luke was familiar with the case while Mr. Gray was not.
(Record, pp.207,209). The Commissioner said:
Now, with respect to Ms. Luke not being here, I'd
like to talk to her and Mr. Godfrey. And, Mr. Gray, I
will hope that you would get that information to them,
and let me talk to them, and ask them to come up and
see me at their earliest convenience. Because that was
an order. And I'm not going to do anything until I
talk to them (Record, p.208).
Mr. Gray suggested to the Court that Mr. Todd Godfrey might
have knowledge about the case and requested that he be given time
17

to consult with Mr. Godfrey.

The Court agreed, but the Court

made it clear that despite the prosecution's lack of preparation
the motion hearing would go forward:
MR. GRAY: He [Mr. Godfrey] is available at this
point, but if he -THE COURT: Would you like to talk to him a moment
before we proceed? Because we are going to proceed.
MR. GRAY: Yeah.
THE COURT: Okay, I'll give him a couple minutes to
talk to Mr. Godfrey. We will proceed today. The
City's had their opportunity to respond, hasn't done
it, that's it.
MR. GRAY: Okay. Well, if he knows anything it
might help me so -THE COURT: Mr. Gray, again I'm sorry to put you in
this position, but I didn't do that.
(Record, pp.209,210)
A recess was then taken to allow Mr. Gray to locate and
consult with Mr. Godfrey.

When Court resumed, Mr. Godfrey was

present and had taken over representation of the City from Mr.
Gray.

The hearing then went forward with introduction of

evidence or proffers of evidence and arguments being made by both
parties.

(Record, pp.211-233.)

At the time that the Commissioner realized Ms. Luke had
failed to appear she could have postponed the hearing until a
date when Ms. Luke could have been present.

However, the Court

determined that it was appropriate to go forward in Ms. Luke's
absence, even though the City was unprepared.
18

The going forward

of the case was itself a sanction against the prosecution.

The

City was forced to proceed without the Court having had the
benefit of a responsive memorandum to the Defendant's written
motion and without witnesses.
Such a sanction was entirely appropriate, since it was the
City's own error that it had failed to reply to the written
motion and properly to prepare for the hearing.

The City had

notice of the date and time of the motion hearing and the Court
was correct in going forward.

Obviously the City was at a great

disadvantage in attempting to argue the matter without proper
preparation.

Not only was the Defendant not prejudiced by the

City's lack of preparation, but the Defendant was significantly
advantaged by it.
In addition to the sanction of forcing the City to go
forward with the hearing, the Court stated, as noted above, that
she wanted to talk to Ms. Luke at another time about Ms. Luke's
violation of what the Court considered to be an order.

In the

event that such a separate hearing were conducted with Ms. Luke,
additional and separate sanctions may have been imposed upon Ms.
Luke.
Despite the Defendant's great advantage at the motion
hearing, she ultimately failed to persuade the Court that her
19

Motion to Dismiss should be granted, since the Court eventually
reversed the verbal judgment of dismissal and found that the
City's Motion for Rehearing should be granted.

(Findings

numbered 8,9 at Record, p.99).
However, once the Court had insisted on going forward with
the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss and had rendered its ruling,
it was inappropriate and an abuse of the Court's discretion to,
eight months later, dismiss the Information, with prejudice, as
an additional sanction against Ms. Luke.

This was especially

inappropriate in view of the Court's finding that the City's
Motion for Rehearing should be granted.

POINT IV.
THE COMMISSIONER'S ORDER THAT
THE SALT LAKE CITY PROSECUTOR APPEAR
AT THE MOTION HEARING AND THE LATER CASE
DISMISSAL FOR HER FAILURE TO APPEAR WAS
A VIOLATION OF SEPARATION OF POWERS
UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
If the Commissioner's April 18, 1994, suggestion to
Prosecutor Godfrey that he request Ms. Luke to be present and
prepared to represent the City at the May 19, 1994 motion hearing
constituted a binding order of the Court, it also constituted a
violation of Article V, Section 1, of the Utah Constitution.
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That Article reads:
The powers of the government of the State of Utah
shall be divided into three distinct departments, the
Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no
person charged with the exercise of powers properlybelonging to one of these departments, shall exercise
and functions appertaining to either of the others,
except in the cases herein expressly directed or
permitted. (Article V, Section 1, Utah Constitution)
There is no constitutional or statutory grant of authority
to the judicial branch of government to exercise the executive
function of determining which prosecutor, in a multi-prosecutor
office, shall represent a municipality in a particular case.
Article V specifically prohibits a person charged with the
exercise of judicial powers from exercising the functions of the
executive unless expressly directed or permitted in the Utah
Cpngtitutipn.

See Kimball v. Grantsville City, 19 Utah 368, 57

P.l, 45 L.R.A. 628 (Utah 1899).
There is a significant difference between (1) the authority
of the Court to secure obedience to its rules and process through
its inherent contempt powers, and (2) the usurpation of the
City's prerogative, acting through the head of its prosecuting
arm, to decide which prosecutor will appear in a particular case
on a particular date.

Cities of the first class, as Salt Lake

City is, have been given specific enabling authority by the

21

Legislature to appoint an attorney to represent the municipality
(Section 10-3-902, Utah Code Annotated).

By legislative

enactment, the City Attorney has been granted authority to
prosecute violations of city ordinances and "has the same powers
in respect to the violations as are exercised by a county
attorney or district attorney. ..."

Section 10-3-928, Utah Code

Annotated, 1954, as amended.
The broad discretion given to prosecutors to determine
whether and in what manner to prosecute, is a hallmark of
constitutional separation of powers, and has been confirmed by
the United States Supreme Court and by numerous lower Courts,
including the Utah Supreme Court.

In Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434

U.S. 357, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed. 2d 604 (1978), the United States
Supreme Court said:
In our system, so long as the prosecutor has probable
cause to believe that the accused committed an offense
defined by statute, the decision whether or not to
prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a
grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364, 98 S.Ct.
663, 668, 54 L.Ed. 2d 604, 611 (1978).
The Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 3 90 (Utah
1989) stated:
The general rule is that prosecutors are given broad
discretion in determining whether and in what manner to
prosecute each case. Indeed, as long as the
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prosecution has probable cause to believe that an
offense has been committed, the decision regarding
whether and in what manner to prosecute "generally
rests entirely in [its] discretion."
[citing
Bordenkircher, supra]. Regarding such, this Court has
heretofore stated:
"It is not the function of the courts to review the
exercise of executive discretion, and we cannot say
that it was even for the prosecutor to treat the
defendants in a different manner, and we cannot review
the prosecutor's decision to proceed against one
defendant under an information charging him with a
felony and reducing the charge against the co-defendant
to a misdemeanor."
[Citing State v. Garcia. 504 P.2d
1015 (Utah 1972).]
*

*

*

The rationale of these cases [cited therein] is
persuasive. This jurisdiction has long recognized the
vital role of the prosecution and the importance of
affording that body discretion, within permissible
limits, to exercise its function. Certainly, we are
compelled, as are our sister states, to recognize this
discretion as it preserves the constitutional concept
of separation of powers. State v. Bell. 785 P.2d 390,
402, 403, 404, (Utah 1989).
Exhibit "A" attached hereto sets forth the job description
maintained by the Human Resources Division of Salt Lake City for
the position of Salt Lake City Prosecutor.

It will be noted that

the duties of that position include overseeing "prosecution of
cases, in all Courts including appeals to the district Court, on
behalf of City, through supervision and assignment of Assistant
City Prosecutors."

(Emphasis added.)

It was inappropriate and violative of the constitutional
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principle of separation of powers for the Court to intrude into
an area reserved exclusively to the discretion of the executive
branch -- that is, to select which prosecutor to prosecute a
particular case at a particular time.

If the Salt Lake City

Prosecutor's exercise of that discretion, in assigning an
Assistant City Prosecutor to handle the motion hearing in the
instant case rather than herself, resulted in the City being
unprepared to go forward, the result is that the City's
prosecution effort may suffer and the Motion to Dismiss may be
granted.

The appropriate sanctions for such may be

administrative action by a supervisor or by the Mayor, but it is
not the purview of the judiciary.

POINT V.
THE COURT'S SANCTION IS INAPPROPRIATE
IN THAT IT PREJUDICES THE PUBLIC'S INTEREST
IN HEALTH. SAFETY AND WELFARE AND ACTS
AS A BAN ON ENFORCEMENT

A.

The dismissal of the City's Information, with prejudice,
violates public policy.
Inherent in the function of municipal governments is the

protection of the public health, safety and welfare.

The Utah

Legislature has given power to all cities within the state to
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...pass all ordinances and rules, and make all
regulations, not repugnant to law, necessary for
carrying into effect or discharging all powers
conferred by this chapter [Chapter 8, Title 10, Utah
Code Annotated!, and as are necessary and proper to
provide for the safety and preserve the health, and
promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace and
good order, comfort and convenience of the city and its
inhabitants.... Section 10-8-84, Utah Code Annotated.

See also Section 10-9-102, Utah Code Annotated.

The specifically

granted regulatory powers of cities include the power to regulate
construction of buildings and removal of buildings and enclosures
constructed or repaired in violation of any ordinance (Section
10-8-52, Utah Code Annotated) and the power to declare what shall
be a nuisance and to abate the same and impose fines upon persons
who may create, continue or suffer nuisances to exist (Section
10-8-60, Utah Code Annotated).
The violations with which the Defendant was charged in the
City's Information were violations of the City's Housing Code and
related ordinances.

Such ordinances are well within the powers

granted Salt Lake City under state law.
The Court's dismissal of the City's Information, with
prejudice, as a sanction against the Salt Lake City Prosecutor
prejudices the public's interest in health, safety and welfare by
essentially legitimizing an allegedly illegal situation.
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Since

the Commissioner had already ruled that her previous verbal
order dismissing the Information should be reversed, the
appropriate remedy was not to punish the public but rather to use
the contempt power available to the Court to punish the
individual attorney involved.

B.

The Court's sanction acts as a ban on enforcement - in
contravention of the rule that government cannot be
estpppefl.
By making the Information dismissal with prejudice, the

Court effectively banned or estopped the City from further
enforcement of the housing code violations which had been
charged.

Estoppel is inappropriate under the facts of this case.

First, the basic elements of equitable estoppel are missing here.
Those elements have been outlined by the Utah Supreme Court as
follows:
The equitable doctrine of estoppel has three factual
predicates: "(1) an admission, statement, or act
inconsistent with the claim afterwards asserted, (2)
action by the other party on the faith of such
admission, statement, or act, and (3) injury to such
other party resulting from allowing the first party to
contradict or repudiate such admission, statement, or
act. Consolidated Coal Co., et.al. v. Utah Division of
State Lands and Forestry, et.al., 886 P.2d 514, 522
(Utah 1994) quoting Plateau Mining Co., et.al. v. Utah
Division of State Lands and Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 728
(Utah 1990) and Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor
Control Comm., 602 P.2d 689, 694 (Utah 1979).
26

In the instant case there was no admission or act of the
City upon which the Defendant relied resulting in injury to the
Defendant.

The Defendant had the advantaged at the motion

hearing due to the prosecution's lack of preparedness.

Yet the

Court ultimately ruled that the Defendant had failed in her
burden to prove that her motion should be granted.
With regard to estoppel against the government, the
Consolidated Coal ruling went on to state that the government may
not be estopped except in unusual circumstances:
These requirements are expanded when a party is
attempting to estop the State or its agents. "The
State may not be estopped unless injustice would result
[if the State were not estopped] and there would be no
substantial adverse effect on public policy."
Consolidated Coal, supra. at 522 (quoting Plateau
Mining, gupra at 728).
See also Utah State Univ. v. Sutro & Co.. 646 P.2d 715, 718 (Utah
1982).

See generally United States v. Kirkpfrtrigk, 22 U.S.

(9 Wheat.) 720, 735-37, 6 L.Ed. 199 (1824).
In the instant case there would be no injustice done if the
dismissal were reversed and the case were allowed to proceed to
trial.

The Defendant failed to prove at the motion hearing that

the Information should be dismissed without a trial.

There will

be a substantial adverse effect on public policy if the dismissal
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is allowed to stand. Justice and public policy demand that the
case proceed to trial and that the City be allowed to attempt to
enforce its ordinances for the general

good.

CONCLUSION
The lower Court's dismissal of the City's criminal
Information, with prejudice, was in error in several respects.
There was an insufficient factual basis for the Court's finding
that it had issued a sanctionable order that Ms. Cheryl Luke, the
Salt Lake City Prosecutor, be present and prepared at the hearing
on the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, and that Ms. Luke had
knowingly violated such order.

However, if it was a sanctionable

order, it was violative of due process as being a sanction for
indirect contempt of Court without affording the alleged
contemnor notice or opportunity for hearing.
Further, the order and the subsequent dismissal were beyond
the powers of the Court Commissioner and an abuse of her
discretion because (1) the City had already been sanctioned when
the Court forced the prosecution to go forward with the hearing
although they were unprepared to do so and (2) such an order was
a usurpation of the City's executive function under the Utah
constitutional principle of separation of powers.
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Finally, the dismissal with prejudice was inappropriate
since it prejudices the public's interest in health, safety and
welfare and acts as a ban and an estoppel on governmental
enforcement in contravention of the long-standing rule that
government cannot be estopped unless injustice would otherwise
result.
For all of the reasons set forth herein, the lower Court's
dismissal, with prejudice, of the City's criminal Information
against Defendant/Appellant should be reversed and the City
should be allowed to go forward with a trial on the Information.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5

day of June, 1995.

Assistant Salt Lake City Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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I hereby certify that I personally delivered a conforming
copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to Kathryn Collard,
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee, #9 Exchange Place, Suite 1100,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this $_
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day of June, 1995.

EXHIBIT "A"
LARRY V. SPENDLOVE, #3 060
Assistant Salt Lake City Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
Salt Lake City Corporation
451 South State Street, Suite 505A
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 53 5-7788

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SALT LAKE CITY,
a municipal corporation,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

AFFIDAVIT OF
CONNIE ALLEN

vs.
Case No. 950166-CA
WYLLIS DORMAN-LIGH,
Defendant/Appellee

STATE OF UTAH
SS
County of Salt Lake
I, Connie Allen, being duly sworn and on my oath, hereby
depose and say as follows:
1.

I am at present employed by Salt Lake City Corporation

("City") in the position of Records Supervisor in the Division of
Human Resource Management.
2.

My duties include acting as custodian of the City's

records relating to job titles and job descriptions of the
employees of the City.
3.

The attached document entitled "JOB TITLE: City

Prosecutor" is a true and correct copy of the record in my
custody which shows details pertaining to the position of City
Prosecutor for the City, including a job summary and the typical
duties of that position.

This document and the duties described

therein have remained janchanged since prior to April, 1994.
DATED this

g^/day of June, 1994.

DNNIE ALLEN

I hereby certify that on the^^^^/day of June, 1995, Connie
Allen, personally known to me, did execute the above document, in
my presence, being first duly sworn and on her oath.

i
My commission expires:
NOTARY PUBLIC
STATE OF UTAH
1SJW7
NANCY T.TORRES
461 South 8 u * & f c a i a
Sift Uk» City, Utah S411t

Z£-

/ • # / / /

Notary Publ
Salt Lbke

m

SUBJECT TO CHANGE
WITHOUT NOTICE

JOB TITLE:
JOB CODE:

City Prosecutor
Q04220

EEO CODE:

BARGAINING UNIT REPRESENTATIVE:

2
Exempt

PAY LEVEL
FLSA:

005 - 1/92

Exempt

JOB SUMMARY:
Under general administrative direction of City Attorney, oversees
and directs activities of City Prosecutorfs Office, including
arraignment and prosecution of persons violating ordinances of
Salt Lake City. This is an administrative appointment.
TYPICAL DUTIES:
1.

Oversees prosecution of cases, in all courts including appeals to district court, on behalf of City, through supervision and assignment of Assistant City Prosecutors. Advises on investigation used to determine if prosecution is
warranted. Initiates as well as assists in negotiation of
complaint settlements to save trial expense and expedite
case termination.

2.

Tries principal criminal cases, prepares pleadings and
briefs, makes oral arguments on behalf of City. Drafts, or
has drafted, legal materials such as complaints, warrants,
and subpoenas and sees that they are properly prepared and
served.

3.

Consults and advises police department officials, City department heads and employees, and general public on matters
concerning criminal law.

4.

Prepares operational budget for Prosecutor1s Office and submits to City Attorney for review and inclusion as part of
Legal Department's annual budget.

5.

Recommends candidates for hiring and promotion; evaluates
Assistant City Prosecutors and support staff; resolves personnel problems within Prosecutor's Office.

6.

Performs related duties as required.

MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS:
1.

Graduation from accredited college or university with JD or
LLB Degree, and six (6) years' full-time employment in
practice of law, including trial work.

2.

Membership in good standing w,vth Utah State Bar Association.

3.

Extensive knowledge of principles of criminal law, judicial
procedures, and rules of evidence.

4.

Ability to direct and supervise a staff of assistant prosecutors and office support personnel.

>.

Ability to communicate effectively, orally and in writing.

6.

Ability to establish and maintain effective working relationships with elected officials, department heads, employees, officials and employees of other jurisdictions, and the
general public.

WORKING CONDITIONS:
1.

Comfortable working positions handling light weights. Intermittent sitting, standing, and walking.

2.

Capacity to glean and rapidly assimilate facts; respond impromptu,, examine witnesses, and argue effectively, often
under hostile and stressful circumstances.

3.

Capacity to organize and retain familiarity with large
numbers of court cases of varying complexity and circumstances within short time periods.

4.

Capacity to acquire and retain current familiarity with rapidly changing principles of law, and to apply principles to
factual situations as presented in court.

5.

Capacity to function under repeated verbal distractions.

The above statements are intended to
and level of work being performed by
job. They are not intended to be an
duties, responsibilities, and skills
classified.
APPROVED BY:
REVISIONS APPROVED BY:
PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT:

describe the general nature
persons assigned to this
exhaustive list of all
required of personnel so

DATE:
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